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SOCIAL SECURrry
INTRODUCTION
Disability benefits play an important role in the broader social safety net'
Individuals suffering from physical or mental disabilities may receive benefit
payments under two major federal programs authorized by the Social Security
Act.2 The Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program pro-
vides workers with an insurance program designed to protect against unexpect-
ed loss of earnings due to injury, retirement, or death.' The Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program offers disability payments for individuals qual-
ifying for the means based welfare program.4 Both OASDI and SSI define
disability as the inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." Determining wheth-
er an individual qualifies as disabled is the most difficult and commonly liti-
gated requirement of both OASDI and SSI.6
The Social Security Administration (SSA) administers the massive OASDI
and SSI programs. One commentator appropriately labeled the SSA disability
program as "the Mount Everest of bureaucratic structures." The entire
OASDI program provides benefits to 45 million individuals, including 5.9
million beneficiaries under disability status.' Almost 800,000 blind or disabled
OASDI beneficiaries also receive SSI payments.' Another 2.4 million blind or
disabled individuals receive only SSI benefits.'0
Individuals denied benefits by the SSA may seek administrative review
and subsequent judicial review in the federal courts." In 1987, administrative
law judges (ALJs) decided 320,000 appeals from SSA decisions. 2 Disability
1. See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY Dis-
ABILTrY CLA.MS 18-20 (1983); Jon C. Dubin, Poverty Pain, and Precedent: The Fifth Circuit's
Social Security Jurisprudence, 25 ST. MARY's LJ. 81, 88 (1993).
2. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
3. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-422 (1994).
4. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383.
5. 42 U.S.C §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1994).
6. Jon C. Dubin, Social Security Law, 26 TEX. TECH L REv. 763, 763-64 (1995); Larry M.
Gropman, Social Security, 1995 DET. C.L. REV. 773, 774 (1995).
7. Paul R. Verkuil, The Self-Legitimating Bureaucracy, 93 YALE LJ. 780, 781 (1984)
(book review).
8. Social Sec. Admin., U.S. Dept of Health & Human Servs., 59 Soc. SEC. BULL. 96
(1996) (listing current SSA operating statistics).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 97.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see generally ARTHUR ABRAHAM & DAvID L KOPELMAN, FEDERAL
SOCIAL SECURITrrY 115-26 (1979) (explaining the steps and issues of the appeal procedure).
12. KENNETH CUL DAvIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINIsTRATIvE LAw TREATISE 6
(3d ed. 1994).
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cases amount to a significant component of the total federal court caseload.
The average circuit court must decide 382 disability cases each year.' 3 Over-
all, appeals from denials of Social Security disability benefits were 5.3% of all
new district court filings and 3.2% of the caseload in the courts of appeals'
The role of judicial oversight is particularly important for the administra-
tion of Social Security disability benefits. 5 Historically, the SSA has been
vulnerable to external pressures and exercised its own bureaucratic power to
influence the overall case load and the level of rejections.' 6 For this reason,
judicial review provides an important check to ensure that the administrative
agency makes informed and rational decisions, acts within its statutory author-
ity, and adheres to fundamental constitutional protection. 7
The Tenth Circuit addressed the role of this important judicial check on
the SSA during the survey period from September 1995 through August 1996.
Section I examines three cases involving enhanced judicial review of SSA
decisions. Section II considers pain and drug addiction, their relation to dis-
ability benefits, and the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of recent congressional
pronouncements against drug addiction. Finally, Section IlI addresses the issue
of reopening a disability case due to fraud, as well as constitutional require-
ments for notice before the SSA terminates benefits.
I. DuTY OF THE ALJ
The Commissioner of Social Security has statutory authority to establish
rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of the Social Security Act'"
and to make determinations about the eligibility of individual disability claim-
ants. 9 The first level of review for an individual pursuing a disability claim
occurs at the state agency level.' If dissatisfied by the initial decision, the
claimant may appeal by seeking administrative review at the federal level."
A federal administrative law judge (ALJ) reviews the application, holds hear-
ings, consults medical and vocational experts, and makes detailed findings to
13. Id. at 7.
14. Richard E. Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations: Recommendations for Re-
form, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 461, 477 n.88 (referencing statistics from the 1987 ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS).
15. See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS 136-46
(1978).
16. Levy, supra note 14, at 484-507. During the 1980's, the Reagan administration sought to
reduce the number of disability beneficiaries by 891,000 through aggressive enforcement and
heightened substantive standards for disability. Id. at 484. The SSA also instituted practices that
pressured ALJs to process claims faster and increase the rate of denials. Id. at 494. Furthermore,
the SSA pursued an explicit policy of nonacquiescence to federal court decisions when it dis-
agreed with lower court decisions. Id. at 503-07. See also DONNA PRICE COFER, JUDGES BUREAU-
CRATS, AND THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE 66-152 (1985) (presenting a detailed review of the
Trachtenberg era, 1975-79, when new management controls were instituted by the Bureau of
Hearings and Appeals, a 1979 suit filed by ALJs, and congressional amendments in 1980).
17. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 12, at 173-210.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b).
20. Levy, supra note 14, at 465-66; SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY
HANDBOOK 15-16 (12th ed. 1995) [hereinafter SSA HANDBOOK].
21. Id. at 471.
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either accept or reject disability claims.'
The AI's determination of disability status must follow a standardized
five step evaluation process.' Step one asks whether the claimant currently
performs work defined in terms of substantial gainful activity."' If the answer
is yes, the ALJ denies disability benefits.' If the answer is no, the AL
moves to step two.26
Step two requires the claimant to show that he suffers from a medically
severe impairment, or combination of impairments, that limits his ability to
perform work.' If the claimant cannot demonstrate a medical impairment, the
ALT denies disability benefits." If the claimant shows the impairments have a
threshold impact on his ability to do work activity, the analysis proceeds to
step three.29
Step three inquires whether the claimant's impairment is equivalent to a
recognized impairment that precludes substantial gainful activity. ° If the
claimant's impairment is one of the recognized impairments, the AJ awards
disability benefits to the claimant.3 If the claimant does not have a recog-
nized impairment, the analysis moves to step four."
Step four examines whether the impairment prevents the claimant from
performing his previous work.33 If the claimant can perform past work, the
AJ denies disability status.' If past work is no longer possible, the analysis
moves to step five.3
22. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.929 (OASDI), 416.1429 (SSI) (1996).
23. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988);
Anthony V. Aifieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 769, 806-11 (1992);
SSA HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 137-49.
24. Williams, 844 F.2d at 750. Regulations define "substantial gainful activity" as "work that
(a) [ilnvolves doing significant and productive physical or mental duties; and (b) [i]s done (or
intended) for pay or profit." 20 C.F.R. § 416.910. The Tenth Circuit elaborated on the meaning of
this term in a 1979 case. Markham v. Califano, 601 F.2d 533, 534 (10th Cir. 1979). The court
stated that substantial gainful activity was work performed on a regular basis. Id. Intermittent
work does not necessarily constitute substantial gainful activity, and the SSA should review med-
ical testimony to determine if such an intermittent worker qualifies for disability benefits. Id.
25. Williams, 844 F.2d at 750.
26. Id.
27. Id. (citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987) (stating that a claimant must
have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, otherwise a claim is denied)). Regula-
tions contain detailed guidelines for listing medically severe impairments that significantly limit
the ability for a person to perform "basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, .1525. Basic
work activities include: "[p]hysical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing,
pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling; ... [clapacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; ...
[u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; ... (u]se of judgment; ...
[r]esponding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and... [d]ealing
with changes in a routine work setting." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521.
28. Williams, 844 F.2d at 751.
29. Id. at 750-51.
30. Id. If a claimant has an impairment either listed by the SSA or equivalent to a listed
impairment, the SSA must find that the claimant is disabled without regard to the claimant's age,
education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).
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Step five explores whether the claimant has the residual functional capaci-
ty to perform other work in the economy given the claimant's age, education,
and work experience.' If'the Secretary can show that alternative employment
opportunities exist in the economy, the AUJ denies disability benefits." If
not, the claimant can be awarded disability benefits."
After AJ review, a denied claim may be appealed to the Appeals Coun-
cil.39 The Appeals Council may deny the request to review, affirm, or reverse
the ALJ. The determination by the Appeals Council represents a final deci-
sion by the Commissioner.4 The claimant may seek judicial review in the
federal courts.' The federal and appellate courts review the record to see if
an AUJ decision was supported by substantial evidence and if the AI fol-
lowed the required regulations.' The following cases illustrate the standards
that the Tenth Circuit applies to ALJ decisions on Social Security disability
decisions.
A. Developing the Record: Carter v. Chater"
1. Facts
Nelda Carter filed for disability insurance benefits claiming disability for
paroxysmal atrial tachycardia, a chronic peptic ulcer, gastrointestinal pain, and
weakness of her upper arm.' The AUL conducted the five-step evaluation
process and denied the claim at step five.* The ALJ determined that Carter
retained residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform sedentary and light
work in the economy.' He then considered Carter's RFC in relation to her
age, education, and work experience by applying the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines.' After analyzing these factors and hearing testimony from a vo-
cational expert, the AL ruled that Carter did not meet the disabled re-
quirements.' The Appeals Council denied her request for review and the dis-
trict court affirmed the AlJ's ruling.' Carter appealed on grounds that the




39. Levy, supra note 14, at 472. The Appeals Council is within the SSA. Id.
40. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967-.981 (OASDI), 416.1467-.1481 (SSI).
41. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. The claimant may file an action in federal district court 60 days
after receipt of notice of the council's decision. Id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
43. Id.
44. 73 F.3d 1019 (10th Cir. 1996).
45. Id. at 1021.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2. The Medical-Vocational Guidelines, commonly
known as "grids," provide a framework to evaluate the residual functional capacity based upon the
claimant's characteristics (age, education, and work experience) and vocational factors describing
the type of work (sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy). Williams, 844 F.2d at 751-52.





physician's report diagnosed Carter as suffering from depression and associat-
ed neuropsychiatric symptoms, the AL rejected the report because he deemed
it unsupported by any testing or clinical interview.52
2. Holding
The Tenth Circuit agreed with Carter's claim that the ALJ failed to devel-
op the record.53 As a general rule, the AJ has a "duty of inquiry to fully and
fairly develop the record as to material issues." 4 Courts impose a heightened
duty to develop the record when the claimant is not represented by counsel.55
The Tenth Circuit determined that the AUJ in Carter's case should have devel-
oped the record concerning the physician's diagnosis of depression.' The
court noted that the AJ failed to sufficiently inquire about Carter's mental
state in the hearings, and he discounted the medical diagnosis of mental de-
pression without seeking further tests or medical consultations."
3. Analysis
The Social Security Act does not envision an adversarial review process
between the claimant and the SSA.-8 Rather, the ALJ has the responsibility to
elicit all information relevant to the claimant's case, decide whether the indi-
vidual has a valid claim, and document the evidence and reasoning of the
decision.59 Based on Carter, the Tenth Circuit will hold ALJs responsible for
a serious examination of the medical evidence for mental illness claims, even
if the claimant has not raised that claim herself.
4. Other Circuits
Other courts have also required ALJ's to take an active role in developing
the record. The Second Circuit reversed an ALJ who failed to record the testi-
mony of a medical expert and ignored other medical records in denying bene-
fits to an HIV positive claimant.' The Fifth Circuit remanded an ALJ's deni-
al of benefits for failing to include a report from the treating physician about
the claimant's ability to work.6 The Ninth Circuit reversed an AI who re-
jected a disability claim based on fatigue and pain because the medical records
were sparse and inadequately documented.' The same court noted the height-
52. Id. at 1021-22.
53. Id. at 1021.
54. Id. (citing Baca v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 5 F.3d 476, 479-80 (10th Cir.
1993)).




58. Levy, supra note 14, at 472; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.944, .950, .1450, 416.144.
59. 20 C.F.R. § 404.944; Baker v. Bowen 886 F.2d 289, 291-92 (10th Cir. 1989).
60. Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 34 (2d Cir. 1996).
61. Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 552 (5th Cir. 1995). But see Brock v. Chater, 84 F.3d 726
(5th Cir. 1991) (upholding an ALJ's refusal to order a consultive examination of a claimant who
wrote a letter after the hearing that raised claims of depression and past drug abuse).
62. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 1996).
1997]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ened duty of the ALI to develop the record of a claimant who is not repre-
sented by counsel.'
B. Explaining the Finding: Clifton v. Chater"
1. Facts
Danny Clifton filed for disability benefits on grounds of a back injury.'
The ALJ applied the five-step analysis and denied his disability claim because
he could still perform sedentary work.' The Appeals Council denied review
and the district court affirmed.' Clifton appealed on grounds that his impair-
ment met the listed requirements and that he did not retain the ability to per-
form sedentary work in the economy.'
2. Holding
The Tenth Circuit rejected the AL's findings because he merely stated
summary conclusions without discussing the evidence at step three, the recog-
nized impairment step.' The Social Security Act specifically requires that the
ALI shall write a "statement of the case, in understandable language, setting
forth a discussion of the evidence, and stating the Commissioner's determina-
tion and the reason or reasons upon which it is based."70 In Clifton, the court
determined that the ALJ did not discuss the evidence nor explain why he re-
jected Clifton's claim at step three."
3. Analysis
Under the Social Security Act, courts do not make factual findings in
social security cases.' The court may not reweigh the evidence nor substitute
its discretion for that of the ALJ." The court's role is to review the record to
ensure that substantial evidence supports the ALI's conclusion and that the
ALJ applied correct legal standards.74 Federal courts require ALJs to present
a detailed explanation of their findings to ensure that reviewing courts can
perform their oversight role.' As the Tenth Circuit noted, without a detailed
account of the AU's findings linked to the evidence, the reviewing court can-
not carry out its proper role of judicial review. 6
63. Id. at 1288.
64. 79 F.3d 1007 (10th Cir. 1996).
65. Id. at 1008.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1009.
69. Id.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1).
71. Clifton, 79 F.3d at 1009.
72. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).
73. Musgrave, 966 F.2d at 1374.
74. Clifton, 79 F.3d at 1009.
75. Id ; Cook v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 1168, 1172-73 (4th Cir. 1986); Brown v. Bowen, 794
F.2d 703, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
76. Clifton, 79 F.3d at 1009.
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The Tenth Circuit reached a similar result in the recent case of Kepler v.
Chater The court remanded the AL's decision because the finding ad-
dressed the complaints about pain in a conclusory fashion.'8 The court found
that the ALT should have considered the claimant's assertions of pain and
explain the specific evidence relevant for rejecting the complaints. Without
knowing the specific evidence or logic that led the ALT to reject the disability
claim, the appellate court cannot determine whether the conclusion is support-
ed by the evidence.' The Tenth Circuit ordered a limited remand with in-
structions for express findings linked to the relevant evidence.8
4. Other Circuits
Two other circuits have reversed ALJ findings for failure to explain their
decisions. The Eighth Circuit overturned an AU's denial of disability benefits
to an individual who claimed he had been suffering from post-traumatic stress
disorder since 1975.82 The Eighth Circuit found that the ALJ failed to include
retrospective medical opinions or evidence of personality change observed by
family members.83 In a similar fashion, the Ninth Circuit rejected an ALT's
limited reasons for turning down an individual's claim for back pain.
C. Substantial Evidence and Bias: Winfrey v. Chater,
1. Facts
William Winfrey filed a disability claim alleging pain in his neck, shoul-
der, back, right leg, and additional problems arising from headaches, asthma,
liver disfunction, hypoglycemia, hiatal hernia, depression, general anxiety
disorder, and somatoform disorder.' Winfrey worked as a truck driver for 21
years in a position that required him to load and unload cargo.U In 1988,
Winfrey injured his neck and shoulder while working and subsequently ob-
tained worker's compensation." He quit his position in 1991 because he
could no longer perform his job in face of growing medical complications."
The AU initially applied the five-step analysis and denied disability based on
the Medical-Vocational Guidelines." The Appeals Council reversed and re-
77. 68 F.3d 387 (10th Cir. 1995).
78. Id. at 390.
79. Id. at 391.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Jones v. Chater, 65 F.3d 102 (8th Cir. 1995).
83. Id. at 104.
84. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 829 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that the AU must provide
specific, cogent reasons for disbelief, and the reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony must
be clear and convincing).
85. 92 F.3d 1017 (10th Cir. 1996).
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manded with orders to obtain further evidence about Winfrey's physical and
mental factors and to reevaluate under proper legal principles.9' In the second
round, the ALT concluded that Winfrey could perform medium work and re-
turn to his past work as a truck driver, but excluded the task of loading or
unloading materials from his truck driving duties.' Winfrey appealed on
grounds that the AL erred in the evaluation of (1) subjective complaints; (2)
mental impairments; (3) RFC; (4) ability to return to work; and (5) vocational
expert testimony.93
2. Holding
The Tenth Circuit reversed because (1) the ALJ's evaluation of subjective
complaints relied on factors not supported by substantial evidence;" (2) the
ALJ improperly substituted his own medical judgment contrary to the advice
of a medical expert; 9 and (3) the AJ committed numerous errors at step
four of the five part sequential analysis."
3. Analysis
The standard of review in Social Security disability claims is whether the
Secretary's decision "is supported by substantial evidence and whether the
Secretary applied the correct legal standards." In Winfrey, the AJ deter-
mined that the claimant had an incentive not to work, based solely on the
AJ's speculation that the claimant's pension might prohibit him from work-
ing.9 Additionally, the ALJ disregarded the medical diagnosis that Winfrey
suffered from a psychological problem combined with a physical disorder."
The AJ discounted these claims based on his assessment that the "claimant is
bored and whiny and has [an] incentive not to work and to complain about
problems."'" The Tenth Circuit expressed concern about the overall tone and
manner with which the AJ evaluated the evidence. 0' The court inferred
from the record that the ALJ may have exhibited some bias in evaluating
Winfrey's case."m In an unusual step, the Tenth Circuit recommended that





93. Id. at 1020.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1022-23.
96. Id. at 1023-25.
97. Washington v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 1437, 1439 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that the court must
"meticulously examine the record" to determine whether the evidence is substantial and must
"take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight").
98. Winfrey, 92 F.3d at 1020-21.
99. 1d at 1020.
100. IM.






The Eleventh Circuit confronted a similar matter concerning AUJ bias in
1996.'" The court reversed an AUl who dismissed the credibility of the
claimant's medical experts because they always side in favor of the claim-
ant."' The district court deduced that the ALJ's past experience or mere gos-
sip formed the basis for the ALJ's dismissal of the medical experts." Under
regulations governing the review process, the "administrative law judge shall
not conduct a hearing if he or she is prejudiced or partial with respect to any
party or has any interest in the matter pending for decision."" 7 The Eleventh
Circuit noted the unique role of the AJ in the disability review process and
that impartiality is essential to the integrity of the system."° The court re-




Although drug addiction does not necessarily affect a person's ability to
engage in physical activity, courts recognize drug addiction as an impairment
that qualifies for disability benefits."0 Claimants can establish drug addiction
as a disability in a two part test (1) the individual must prove that he has lost
the ability to control his use of the drug; and (2) the addiction, alone or in
combination with other impairments, prevents the individual from performing
substantial gainful activity."' The Tenth Circuit addressed this issue most
recently in the following case.
A. Drug Addiction and Pain Evaluation: Saleem v. Chater" 2
1. Facts
Suhiyr Saleem filed for SSI benefits alleging a disability due to arthritis,
headaches, back problems, and nerves." 3 The ALJ initially rejected Saleem's
disability claim but the Appeals Council reversed and remanded with instruc-
104. Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that the district court confronted
conflicting physician opinions about whether the claimant retained the residual functional capacity
to perform sedentary tasks).
105. Id at 1400.
106. Id
107. Id (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.940).
108. Id. at 1401.
109. Id
110. Channel v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 577, 580 (10th Cir. 1984) (citing Odle v. Heckler, 707
F.2d 439, 440 (9th Cir. 1983) and McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1148 (8th Cir. 1982)).
The SSA's Medical-Vocational Guideline used to evaluate physical and mental impairments is
based on physical abilities, such as the ability to lift or walk; but SSA regulations do recognize
that certain nonexertional impairments may also qualify for benefits. Id. These other impairments
include drug addiction, mental impairments, pain, alcoholism, dizziness and psychiatric disorders.
Id.
11. Coleman v. Chater, 58 F.3d 577, 579 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating the two part test when the
plaintiff suffered from alcoholism).
112. 86 F.3d 176 (10th Cir. 1996).
113. 1U at 178.
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tions to consider Saleem's substance abuse problem.' 4 In a second hearing,
the ALJ again denied disability status after conducting the five step evalua-
tion." The AIJ asserted that Saleem could control her pain by taking pre-
scription drugs and thereby retained the capacity to perform work."6 The
Appeals Council denied review and the district court affirmed.""
2. Holding
The Tenth Circuit determined that the ALJ did not properly consider
Saleem's pain disability in light of her addiction to prescription drugs. The
court declared that "the ALJ cannot discredit a claimant's assertions of dis-
abling pain by relying on her use of medicines to which the medical evidence
clearly indicates she is addicted, and which she should have long ago stopped
taking, but which presently provide adequate pain relief."".8
3. Analysis
The ALJ rejected Saleem's allegation of disabling pain based in part on a
statement by her physician that her pain can be controlled by medication." 9
The Tenth Circuit found that the ALJ did not give adequate consideration to
the negative side effects of the medication, despite statements by the physician
that Saleem's medication served her more harm than good."2 According to
the court, the ALJ's decision would force Saleem back to work, addicted, but
free from severe pain."' The Tenth Circuit reasoned that such a result would
violate congressional policy statements declaring that Social Security laws
should not be applied to perpetuate drug addiction.'" The court remanded
the case with instructions for an ALJ to reconsider Saleem's claims of dis-
abling pain and provide legitimate reasons for accepting or denying her credi-
bility.1
The significance of Saleem and the future role of substance abuse in So-
cial Security disability may be altered by recent congressional action. Amend-
ments to the Social Security Act signed into law on March 29, 1996, deny
disability benefits if drug addiction or alcoholism forms the basis for the dis-
ability determination. 4 Individuals who obtained disability status based sole-




116. Ild. at 178-79.
117. Id. at 178.
118. Id. at 179-80.
119. Id. at 180.
120. Id. at 179.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 180.
124. Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 105(c), 110
Stat. 847 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)).
125. Senator McCain, one of the amendment's sponsors, described the amendment as denying
SSI benefits to those whose sole disability is drug addiction or alcoholism. 142 CoNG. REC.
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Based upon the amendment and its intent, courts will likely distinguish
between claimants in the position of Saleem and others who purposely con-
sume addictive substances. The Saleem-type claimant seeks to obtain disability
status on a basis independent of the addiction and should remain eligible for
benefits if the SSA carefully administers the amendment.
4. Other Circuits
The Tenth Circuit took recognized that other circuits had addressed this
issue." The Seventh Circuit permitted a claimant to avoid pain relief medi-
cation that would otherwise allow him to work if he had a reasonable fear of
becoming addicted." The Eighth Circuit considered a case where the claim-
ant alleged disabling back pain and the treating physician discontinued pre-
scription medication, fearing that the claimant was becoming addicted. The
Eighth Circuit remanded with instructions to hear vocational expert testimony
and determine whether the Secretary can demonstrate that the claimant could
perform jobs available in the economy." This past year, the Eighth Circuit
upheld an ALJ who determined that a claimant's alcoholism problem was
sufficiently controlled to justify omitting that factor when conducting an anal-
ysis of functional limitations.'"
IIl. OVERPAYMENT AND NoTIcE
An individual receiving disability benefits may perform some work so
long as the work level and earnings do not exceed guidelines known as sub-
stantial gainful activity (SGA)."' SSA regulations establish standards for de-
termining the SGA threshold. 3' A second set of SGA regulations applies to
those who are statutorily blind.32 The SSA may examine a claimant's past
earnings to determine if the claimant performed SGA.'33 If the SSA discov-
ers that the claimant's application involved fraud or fault,'34 the SSA can re-
open the individual's case and recover for overpayment.135 This issue arose
in the following case.
S3114-02, 53117 (daily ed. March 28, 1996) (statement of Sen. McCain). Several senators voiced
their concern that drug addicts and alcoholics used their benefits to finance their addictions. Id.
Senator McCain noted that the amendment would save approximately $3.5 billion over two years.
Id.
126. Saleem v. Chater, 86 F.3d 176, 179 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Seventh and Eighth Circuit
decisions).
127. Dray v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 10 F.3d 1306, 1313 (7th Cir. 1993).
128. Dover v. Bowen, 784 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1986).
129. Mapes v. Chater, 82 F.3d 259 (8th Cir. 1996).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(4); Jozefowicz v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1352, 1356 (10th Cir. 1987)
(applying § 423(d)(4)); see generally Daniel M. Taubman, Tenth Circuit Update of Social Security
Cases, 43 Soc. SEC. REP. SER. 817, 825-26 (1994).
131. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571-.1576 (1996).
132. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1584.
133. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(1).
134. See generally SSA HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 31-32.
135. Fowler v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 1451, 1453-54 (10th Cir. 1989); see generally Michael R.
Schuster et al., Social Security Advocacy After Your Client's Application for Benefits Has Been
Granted, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 605, 613-15 (1995) (explaining what an attorney should do if
the SSA has made an overpayment).
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A. Fraud, Overpayment and Notice: Marshall v. Chater' 3
1. Facts
Ray Marshall initially received Social Security disability benefits for
blindness in 1974.1 7 Marshall started working at the University of New
Mexico in 1979 and earned a salary below the SGA limits.13 Over the next
ten years, Marshall received pay increases that put him over the SGA lim-
its.139 In 1987 and 1988, he submitted reports to the SSA understating his
actual earnings. 4 The SSA discovered evidence of these discrepancies and
started an investigation in 1990.14
In September 1991, the SSA contends that it sent Marshall a notice about
the alleged SGA violations. Marshall asserted that he never received the no-
tice. 42 While there is a dispute over the initial notice, the SSA notified Mar-
shall in October 1991 of its determination that he engaged in SGA back in
1984, and sent him a notice on December 20 regarding its impending recon-
sidered decision. 43 In a series of procedural moves, the SSA terminated
Marshall's benefits and Marshall sought to reverse the SSA action in federal
court. ' " In February 1992, the district court concluded the benefits were not
available and dismissed Marshall's complaint for failure to exhaust administra-
tive remedies. Marshall requested a new administrative hearing and the
ALJ remanded to the SSA for reconsideration.' The SSA reopened
Marshall's case based on new and material evidence and determined that he
had performed SGA in 1986. Upon review of the SSA decision, the ALJ con-
cluded: (1) Marshall received proper notice either by the September 1991
notice, oral contacts with SSA, or the December 20, 1991, letter, (2) the SSA
had authority to reopen the case based on new and material evidence; (3) Mar-
shall performed SGA since February 1986 and was not entitled to benefits
after April 1986; and (4) the SSA could recover an overpayment equal to
$82,349 from Marshall."" The Appeals Council denied review and the dis-
trict court affirmed.' 4
2. Holding
The Tenth Circuit upheld the AJ's findings that (1) the SSA had the
authority to reopen the case and terminate benefits;' 4 (2) the SSA satisfied
its constitutional due process requirements of notice by sending a letter and
136. 75 F.3d 1421 (10th Cir. 1996).












149. Id. at 1426.
[Vol. 74:2
SOCIAL SECURITY
providing an opportunity to respond;"'° and (3) the claimant was not entitled
to benefits during the appeals process.'51
3. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the SSA has authority to reopen a case and
terminate benefits of one who had previously participated in SGA. 52 Under
SSA regulations, a blind person's entitlement to benefits ends the very month
that person engages in SGA.'53 The Tenth Circuit rejected Marshall's argu-
ment that the SSA improperly reopened the case because there was no "new"
evidence since the reopening occurred four years after the prior determina-
tion. 54 The court interpreted "new evidence" to include information not be-
fore the decisionmaker who made the prior determination. 5 ' In Marshall's
case, his true earnings were not before the SSA decisionmaker in 1988. The
SSA effectively reopened the 1988 determination when it concluded in Oc-
tober 1991 that Marshall had previously performed SGA in 1984."
In terms of the constitutional issue, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the SSA
did not violate Marshall's due process rights. Under Mathews v. Eldridge,'57
a claimant must be given notice before the agency terminates disability bene-
fits." After Mathews, courts evaluating challenges to procedural due process
must consider the following three factors: (1) the private interest affected by
the agency action; (2) the risk of error in the procedure; and (3) balancing the
government's interest in maintaining the existing procedure with the burdens
of instituting new procedures." 9 In Marshall's case, the court said it was un-
clear whether the September 1991 predetermination letter was ever sent."
Even if it was not sent, the letter of December 20, 1991, cured the possible
error to provide adequate notice. 6 ' The Tenth Circuit effectively determined
there was no risk of error associated with the second factor since the claimant
received notice through the December 20, 1991, letter. 62
On the third issue, the Tenth Circuit ruled that Marshall was not entitled
to benefits while his appeal was pending before the ALJ.63 Under the stat-
ute, a claimant has the right to receive benefits during an administrative appeal
when "the physical or mental impairment on the basis of which such benefits
are payable is found to have ceased, not to have existed, or to no longer be
disabling."'" The SSA interpreted the statute narrowly to apply only to cases
150. Id. at 1427-28.
151. Id. at 1428.
152. Id. at 1426-28.
153. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1586(a)(3) (1996).
154. Marshall, 75 F.3d at 1426.
155. Id. (citing Dugan v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 1384, 1390 (7th Cir. 1992)).
156. Id. (citing Taylor ex rel. Peck v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 1112, 1115 (10th Cir. 1984)).
157. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
158. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332-33, 348-49.
159. WILLIAM J. Fox, UNDERSTANDING ADMMSTRATIVE LAW 112 (2d ed. 1992).
160. Marshall, 75 F.3d at 1427.
161. Id. at 1427-28.
162. Id. at 1427.
163. Id. at 1428.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 423(g)(1)(B) (1994).
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of cessation of medical disability benefits, and not to cases of excessive earn-
ings." The Tenth Circuit upheld the agency's interpretation under the Chev-
ron analysis regarding court deference paid to an agency's permissible con-
struction of a statute."6 In Marshall, the court determined the statute and leg-
islative history were ambiguous, and upheld the agency's interpretation under
a deferential standard. 67 On all three issues addressed in Marshall, the Tenth
Circuit showed deference to the SSA in its efforts to discover fraud and take
steps to terminate benefits to a claimant that is not eligible for disability ben-
efits.'a
IV. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's decisions involving Social Security disability benefits
reflect a continuing effort to ensure administrative justice to claimants and
promote efficient administration of the massive disability program. The Tenth
Circuit will not tolerate AI decisions that do not fully develop the record,"6
explain the rationale behind a conclusion, 70 or exhibit the appearance of bi-
as.'' The court interpreted congressional concern over drug addiction to
impose safeguards that restrict the disability program's encouragement of
addiction by individuals suffering from pain."' Finally, it allowed discretion
to the SSA when the agency seeks to curtail fraud and abuse by approving
reasonable procedural notice requirements and granting deferential interpreta-
tion of the Social Security Act. "
Thomas A. Carr
165. Marshall, 75 F.3d at 1428.
166. Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984) ("If... the statute is ambiguous or silent on the issue in question, we must
determine whether the agency's determination is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
If so, we will defer to the agency's interpretation.")).
167. Marshall, 75 F.3d at 1428.
168. See generally Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421 (10th Cir. 1996).
169. Carter v. Chater, 73 F.3d 1019, 1021 (10th Cir. 1996).
170. Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996).
171. Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1020, 1022-25 (10th Cir. 1996).
172. Saleem v. Chater, 86 F.3d 176, 179-80 (10th Cir. 1996).
173. Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426-28 (10th Cir. 1996).
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